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I. INTRODUCTION—THE HARTFORD                                                      
IMMIGRATION COURT 
A startling conclusion arose from a case decided last summer in the 
United States Immigration Court at Hartford, Connecticut.  In an opinion 
issued June 1, 2009, after characterizing the respondent’s testimony as 
candid, forthright, both internally consistent and consistent with his 
written declaration and with other testimony and declarations made in 
the case, Immigration Judge Michael W. Straus dismissed the case.  The 
Judge found that, while the respondent was sleeping in his room with his 
wife and children in the early morning hours, he was awakened by a 
knocking on the front door and then on the back door.  When he asked 
the identity of the knocker, he was informed it was the police.  After 
asking them who they were looking for, they said they were looking for 
someone named “Chavez.”  The respondent opened the door a few 
inches, and without asking his permission to enter, an officer forcibly 
pushed open the door.  While his son translated, the respondent was 
asked about his immigration status; he was later arrested.1 
At the conclusion of the case, the Judge ruled that the agents’ entry 
violated the respondent’s Fourth Amendment rights.2  The court 
specifically addressed the “aggressive nature of the forced entry, which 
required a resident to move back out of fear of being struck by the door 
into a private residence at dawn.”3  Finding that the subsequent conduct 
of the immigration officers “lends further support to our conclusion that 
respondent has displayed the necessary aggravating circumstances” 
confirming a flagrant violation of the respondent’s Fourth Amendment 
rights,4 the Judge excluded the testimony and dismissed the case, a rare 
result among evidentiary challenges brought in immigration courts, 
where when successful, generally only remands result. 
The case alerted me to the continuing issue concerning the treatment 
of alleged violations of Fourth Amendment rights in immigration court, 
with this article the result of research conducted relating thereto.  
Beyond reviewing the relevant views of the federal courts of appeals; the 
administrative tribunal that handles appeals of immigration court cases, 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA); and even local immigration 
courts; I consider whether the jurisprudence has remained static since the 
 
 1. In Removal Proceedings, at 23 (Hartford Immigr. Ct., June 1, 2009) (Straus, 
I.J.). 
 2. Id. at 24. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
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Supreme Court’s watershed opinion on the issue about twenty-five years 
ago.  I also offer suggestions as to how to effectively, fairly, and 
efficiently resolve the issues raised in the immigration context by these 
Fourth Amendment cases. 
Part II presents an overview of the jurisprudence governing 
application of the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings.  Part III 
visits judicial responses to violations of regulatory authority governing 
detention and deportation procedures.  Part IV surveys recent BIA and 
immigration court interpretations of the exclusionary rule and illustrates 
the difficulty of maintaining the divergent jurisprudence that currently 
exists among the courts of appeals. Part V identifies issues on which 
recent opinions hint at a possible turn in favor of enhanced civil rights’ 
protections in these cases, where “cracks”5 could be developing in the 
long-standing rule disadvantaging respondents in immigration hearings.  
This section then moves to suggest a unifying jurisprudence on this issue 
that is more likely to result in fair and just results. 
I must thank Michael J. Wishnie, Supervising Attorney at the Jerome 
N. Frank Legal Services Organization at Yale Law School, and his law 
student representatives, for inspiring me through their efforts, for 
providing me with redacted copies of the decisions and briefs in the New 
Haven case, and for convincing Judge Straus that when the government 
gathers evidence against an immigrant in an unconstitutional manner, the 
case must be dismissed. 
II. HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE APPLICATION OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT IN IMMIGRATION HEARINGS, THE                                             
SUPREME  COURT, AND THE CIRCUIT                                                            
COURTS’ RESPONSES 
A. Traditional Inapplicability of Constitutional Protections                   
Lifted by a 1984 Supreme Court Case 
The jurisprudential history of immigration law has caused any 
discussion of the civil rights of immigrants to follow a non-traditional 
 
 5.  Reference to “cracks” is borrowed from Steve Legomsky & Christina Rodriguez, 
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 195–97 (Thomson Reuters/Foundation 
Press, 5th ed. 2009).  Reference to “cracks” is borrowed from Steve Legomsky & Christina 
Rodriguez’s book, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY (5th ed. 2009) at 195 et. 
seq. 
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path.  While academic discussions of constitutional issues generally 
begin with a review of the relevant constitutional provisions, and then 
move on to a study of relevant statutory and regulatory authority 
followed by discussion of applicable case law, immigration law is 
different in the historically limited application of constitutional 
protections to immigrants.6 
 
 6. Beginning with the case of Chae Chang Ping v. United States  (“Chinese Exclusion 
Case”) in 1889, the Supreme Court has established substantial jurisprudence holding 
consistently, for about a century, the plenary power doctrine limited the Court’s ability to 
review federal immigration legislation and that the federal government has an inherent 
power to exclude non-citizens. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion 
Case) 130 U.S. 581, 610-11 (1889). Nishimura Ekiu v. United States held that the Due 
Process Clause does not limit this power to exclude.  Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 
U.S. 651, 660 (1892).  The theory of these cases was applied to deportation in Fong Yue 
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893) (requiring a white witness to attest to a 
Chinese immigrant’s presence), in which the Court held that the power to exclude is inherent 
in sovereignty, and that only those in the country legally are entitled to constitutional 
protections. 
This lack of judicial authority over immigration laws continued to be extended to 
procedural due process, at least as far as those entering the country were concerned.  In 
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessey, 338 U.S. 537, 543-44 (1950), an exclusion 
was upheld in spite of it having been carried out without a hearing, based on confidential 
government information.  The chilling phrase from this case, “[w]hatever procedure 
authorized by Congress . . . is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned,” 
is an infamous reminder of Knauff to this day. 
Affirming the power of exclusion as a “fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by 
the Government’s political departments” that is “largely immune from judicial control,” 
the Court affirmed exclusion in Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213 (1953) that 
could have resulted in the indefinite detention on Ellis Island of a non-citizen who had 
no country to return to. 
In Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972), the Court expanded the plenary 
power theory by rejecting a challenge to exclusion on the basis of substantive due 
process rights, in this case those guaranteed by the First Amendment.  In the case, the 
Court permitted exclusion based on either advocacy or publishing pro-communist 
doctrine.  In Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 797 (1977), this power was extended to those 
who were illegitimate. 
Clearly this doctrine appears inconsistent with Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 
(1803), wherein the Supreme Court asserted its power to review the constitutionality of 
federal legislation.  In addition, some of the Court’s earlier proclamations have been 
adjusted over the years.  For example, it is now clear that while Fong Yue Ting still holds 
that the federal government has the constitutional power to decide upon the deportation 
of even lawful immigrants, procedural due process does apply in deportation cases.  As 
to whether that is also true in exclusion cases, the answer is less clear. 
Some rights have been acknowledged by the Supreme Court.  Procedural due process 
rights in deportation hearings to those already here were acknowledged in 1903 in 
Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 97 (1903) (see discussion in Judy C. Wong, Egregious 
Fourth Amendment Violations and the Use of the Exclusionary Rule in Deportation Hearings: 
The Need for Substantive Equal Protection Rights for Undocumented Immigrants, 38 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 431, 437-38 (1997)). 
More recently, with cases including Francis v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 
532 F.2d 268, 272 (2d Cir. 1976) (ruling on a constitutional basis in a case involving 
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On the issue of the Fourth Amendment’s application in removal7 
hearings, though, the tables have turned; there actually is jurisprudence 
surrounding this important issue that arises commonly in immigration 
hearings.  This is the result of a United States Supreme Court ruling in a 
1984 case, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza,8 
in which it issued an important decree on the role of the Fourth 
Amendment’s9 exclusionary rule in immigration hearings. 
Prior to Lopez-Mendoza, even though no case had explicitly denied 
application of the Fourth Amendment in deportation proceedings, this 
was long assumed to be the case by several federal courts of appeals.10  
In Lopez-Mendoza, the Court held that the traditional remedy for a 
Fourth Amendment violation, suppression of both illegally-seized 
evidence11 and evidence that is the indirect product of illegal police 
activity as “fruit of the poisonous tree,”12 was generally unavailable in 
immigration court hearings, so long as the case was supported by 
 
relief from deportation); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 
959 (1983) (striking a federal statutory provision that it decided violated the principle of 
separation of powers); and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 679 (2001) (striking a 
provision that violated due process by permitting the government to unconditionally and  
indefinitely detain a non-citizen); it has become evident by inference that the Court does 
believe it has at least some authority to review certain principles of immigration law.  
These cases have given rise to the notion among scholars that “cracks” have developed 
in the plenary power doctrine.  See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 5. 
 7. This term refers to what is commonly referred to as “deportation;” the term 
was replaced by “removal” in a 1996 statute (8 U.S.C. § 1229) making substantial 
changes to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 
Stat. 163 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 8. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1033 
(1984). 
 9. The Fourth Amendment provides the following: “The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be  violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by  Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized.”  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Violations of the Fourth 
Amendment generally lead to the exclusion of evidence obtained as a result, hence the 
term “Exclusionary Rule.” 
 10. United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 155 (1923); In re 
Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70, 82 (B.I.A. 1979). 
 11. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (barring use in federal 
courts of evidence seized by federal officers in violation of 4th Amendment); see also, 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)  (barring use in state courts of evidence seized 
in violation of Fourth Amendment); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960)  
(barring use in federal courts of evidence seized by state officers in violation of Fourth 
Amendment). 
 12. Wong Sun. v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963). 
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“credible evidence derived from a peaceful arrest.”13  One of the bases 
 
 13. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1051.  Subsequent courts have understood Lopez-
Mendoza to stand for that proposition. See, e.g., Mendoza-Solis v. Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv., 36 F.3d 12, 14 (5th Cir. 1994).  The notion that the Constitution 
does not mandate the exclusionary rule to apply in civil proceedings was affirmed that 
same year in Adamson v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 745 F.2d 541, 545 (9th Cir. 
1984), which cited Lopez-Mendoza.  While the distinction between “civil” deportation 
hearings and criminal cases may have had some rational support in the past, as a result of 
changes in the law that began in the late-1980s and continued through 2001, criminal and 
immigration law have become dramatically and, many say, inappropriately intertwined.  
See Diana R. Podgomy, Rethinking the Increased Focus on Penal Measures in 
Immigration Law as Reflected in the Expansion of the “Aggravated Felony” Concept, 99 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 287, 290 (2009); Juliet Stumpf, The CrimmigrationCrisis: 
Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376 (2006) (discussing the 
reasons behind this merger); Teresa Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration 
Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 617-18 (2003) (noting that 
immigration scholars see this intersection as the importation of crimes into immigration 
law, while criminal scholars view it as the imposition of the administrative and 
regulatory characteristics of immigration control into the criminal justice system); Teresa 
Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control After 
September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 122 (2005) (existence of the merger 
itself); Margaret H. Taylor & Ronald F. Wright, The Sentencing Judge as Immigration 
Judge, 51 EMORY L.J. 1131, 1131(2002) (describing the parallels between deportation 
and punishment, and the constitutional consequences of criminalizing immigration law); 
Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment:  Some Thoughts About 
Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1889, 1893-94 (2000) (describing 
the way in which deportation acts as does punishment, incapacitating the deportee, 
deterring other potential offenders, and achieving retribution; suggesting that the 
deportation of lawful  residents, if understood to be punishment, necessitates substantive 
constitutional protections, especially when applied retroactively or without counsel); 
Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented:  Ironic Boundaries of the Post-
September 11th “Pale of Law,” 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 639, 656 (2004). 
“More immigration violations now constitute crimes.”  See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f) 
(2006), criminalizing a pattern or practice of knowingly hiring, recruiting, or referring 
for a fee an unauthorized alien for employment (§ 1324a(a)(1)(A)), or knowingly 
continuing to employ an unauthorized alien (§ 1324a(a)(2); § 1325(c) (criminalizing 
persons to marry for purpose of evading immigration laws); § 1325(d) (outlining 
criminal penalties imposed on those who establish commercial enterprises for purpose of 
evading immigration laws); § 1326(b)(1) (criminalizing noncitizens with misdemeanors 
who attempt to unlawfully re-enter the United States); Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 
3009-546-3009-724 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C and 18 U.S.C.) 
(criminalizing exceeding the speed limit while fleeing an immigration checkpoint, knowingly 
failing to disclose role as preparer of false immigration application, knowingly making a 
false claim of U.S. citizenship, and failing to cooperate in the execution of one’s removal 
order); Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. AND LEE L. REV. 1683, 1685 (2009); see 
also Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law:  Asymmetric Incorporation 
of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 477-80 (2007) (hereafter “New 
Path”) (noting that “[s]ince 1986, Congress has liberally expanded the list of 
immigration offenses”); in addition, since the 1980s, prosecution of immigration-related 
crimes has increased greatly, Teresa Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration 
Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 639 (2003)  (detailing the 
increase in the number of noncitizens who face criminal punishment for crimes that were 
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once only civil violations)]; see also Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, 
Crime, and Sovereign Power, supra at 388 (noting that immigration prosecutions 
outnumber all other types of federal criminal prosecutions). “Immigration law has 
become so tightly interwoven with criminal justice norms as to constitute a distinct legal 
category.”  Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, supra at 1686; Nora V. Demleitner, Immigration 
Threats and Rewards: Effective Law Enforcement Tools in the “War” on Terrorism?, 51 
EMORY L.J. 1059, 1061-73 (2002) (describing how immigration law has become a tool of 
the criminal justice system); Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and 
Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 1889, 1891 (2000) (noting the convergence between immigration law and criminal 
justice); Legomsky, The New Path, supra at 471-73 (detailing the intersection of 
criminal justice and immigration control); Miller, Citizenship and Severity, supra at 613 
(describing the intimacy between the criminal justice system and immigration law as the 
“criminalization of immigration law”);  Miller, Blurring the Boundaries, supra at 82 
(noting that commentators have alternately described the changing relationship between 
criminal justice and immigration law as the “‘criminalization’ of immigration law” and 
as a “convergence between the criminal justice and deportation systems”); and Stumpf, 
The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, supra at 376, 384 
(describing civil immigration violations that have been elevated to criminal offenses). 
Another issue addressed in Lopez-Mendoza but beyond the scope of this article is 
when, if at all, evidence of a non-citizen’s identity could be suppressed.  One short 
sentence in the case has led to much confusion:  “The ‘body’ or identity of a defendant 
or respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding is never itself suppressible as a fruit of an 
unlawful arrest.” Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1039.   Despite the apparent clarity of that 
statement, many cases have taken up the issue, with some finding ambiguities that have 
resulted in both suppression of evidence and admission of it.  Several federal circuit 
courts have ruled that, despite alleged egregiousness of constitutional violations, the 
identity of a defendant (emphasis supplied) is never suppressible. See, e.g., United States 
v. Del Toro Gudino, 376 F.3d 997, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004), United States v. Navarro-Diaz, 
420 F.3d 581, 588 (6th Cir. 2005) (denying suppression of a defendant’s name and date 
of birth when disclosed as a result of an allegedly unconstitutional detention), Navarro-
Chalan v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 2004). Cf., United States. v. Oscar-Torres, 
507 F.3d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Despite the illegality of his detention or arrest, he 
cannot suppress his person or the fact of his identity.”) (ruling that when fingerprints are 
obtained by officers motivated by an investigative purpose, they are obtained by 
“exploitation of police illegality” and must be suppressed, but that if this evidence was 
obtained for and motivated by an administrative purpose, the evidence is admissible; the 
court recognized that if a court concludes that both investigative and administrative 
purposes motivated the illegal arrest and fingerprinting, the fingerprints and attendant 
record evidence must be suppressed). 
The Eighth Circuit, however, in United States v. Guevara-Martinez, distinguishing 
criminal from deportation cases, held that Lopez-Mendoza was irrelevant to suppression 
of unlawfully obtained identity-related evidence in a criminal case. United States v. 
Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 754 (8th Cir. 2001).  Guevara-Martinez has been 
narrowed more recently, in United States v. Rodriguez-Arreola, 270 F.3d 611, 618 (8th 
Cir. 2001) and United States v. Perez-Perez, 337 F.3d 990, 994 (8th Cir. 2003).  In 
Guevara-Martinez, the suppressed evidence was not actually identity evidence, but 
fingerprints obtained as the result of unlawful arrests. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d at 
754. Since then, the Eighth Circuit has indicated that, if faced with a defendant seeking 
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for the ruling was the Court’s assumption that “the I.N.S. has its own 
comprehensive scheme for deterring Fourth Amendment violations by 
its officers.”14  In addition, the Court indicated that the deterrent effect of 
applying the exclusionary rule in civil cases, including deportation 
hearings, would be minimal compared with the significant costs of 
enforcing the rule.15 
Regardless of both the plenary power and the Court’s conclusion on 
the constitutional question in Lopez-Mendoza, the Court did leave open 
the possibility for suppression of evidence in certain immigration cases.  
First, the Court noted that its “conclusions concerning the exclusionary 
rule’s value might change, [sic] if there developed good reason to 
believe that Fourth Amendment violations by I.N.S. officers were 
widespread.”16  Most important, it added that it had not dealt “with 
egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might 
transgress notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative 
value of the evidence obtained.”17 Clearly, the Court “implicitly 
recognized that the ‘imperative’ of safe-guarding judicial integrity, 
 
to suppress only his identity (and not fingerprints), it would not invoke the exclusionary 
rule. Perez-Perez, 337 F.3d at 994. 
 14. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1044.  “I.N.S.” refers to the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, the legacy executive department responsible for administering 
immigration laws before it was replaced, in 2003, by the Department of Homeland 
Security and, within that, the newly-created Citizenship and Information Service (“CIS”). 
 15. Id. at 1046.  Since 1923, the Court has held that deportation is a civil remedy, 
thus the rights afforded criminal defendants in court need not be granted those in 
deportation proceedings. Bilokumsky, 263 U.S. at 154.  In 1979, the Board of Immigration 
Appeals ruled as well in Matter of Sandoval, that the Fourth Amendment did not apply in 
deportation proceedings. In re Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70, 82 (B.I.A. 1979). 
 16. For a creative approach to the Lopez-Mendoza limitation developed recently, 
see Stella Burch Elias, “Good Reason to Believe”:  Widespread Constitutional Violations in 
the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 
WIS. L. REV. 1109, 1155 (2008) (arguing that because constitutional violations are so 
widespread today compared with 1984, and because immigration enforcement has changed 
fundamentally since then, the assumptions that underlay the opinion in Lopez-Mendoza  
have been eroded, and that, to remain faithful to the case, the exclusionary rule should be 
reintroduced in immigration proceedings). 
 17. Earlier in the opinion the Justices discussed the array of justifications for the 
exclusionary rule offered over the years, one being to deter future unlawful police conduct; it 
eventually concluded that the burdens versus benefits militated against its application in 
deportation hearings.  See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1041-50.  The Court pointed out 
that even the BIA had agreed with this proscription.  In re Toro, 17 I. & N. Dec. 340, 
343 (B.I.A. 1980) (holding, though, that evidence obtained by coercion or other activity 
that violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment may be excluded) available 
at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/lib_indecitnet.html; Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 
1050-51. 
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another core function of the exclusionary rule, would sometimes require 
application of the rule even in the civil context.”18 
It is axiomatic in constitutional law that, in a criminal case, evidence 
may be suppressed if seized in contravention of a defendant’s rights 
under the Fourth Amendment.19  The word “defendant” here is key, and 
is behind an important impasse for many immigration scholars: the 
distinction made between criminal defendants and immigration respondents.  
Because of the long-held view that deportation hearings are civil in 
nature,20 application of the rights granted to criminal defendants have 
generally not been afforded to respondents in deportation hearings, even 
though several of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, among them both 
procedural21 and substantive due process (Fifth Amendment),22 the 
rights to free speech and association (First Amendment),23 and the 
 
 18. Gonzalez-Rivera v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 22 F.3d 1441, 1448 
(9th Cir. 1994) (citing Adamson v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 745 F.2d 541, 545-546 
(9th Cir. 1984)). 
 19. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 488 (1963). 
 20. Bilokumsky, 263 U.S. at 154; Trias-Hernandez v. Immigration & Naturalization 
Serv., 528 F.2d 366, 368 (9th Cir. 1975).  In spite of this well-established principle, 
several courts have objected: The Court in Bridges v. Wixon, for example, said that 
deportation “may nevertheless visit as great a hardship as the deprivation of the right to 
pursue a vocation or a calling.” 326 U.S. 135, 147, 146 (1945) (citations omitted). “Here 
the liberty of an individual is at stake . . . We are dealing here with procedural requirements 
prescribed for the protection of the alien.  Though deportation is not technically a 
criminal proceeding, it visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the 
right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom.  That deportation is a penalty—at 
times a most serious one—cannot be doubted. Meticulous care must be exercised lest the 
procedure by which he is deprived of that liberty not meet the essential standards of 
fairness.” Id. at 154.  And Justice Brandeis, speaking in Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 
276, 284 (1922), reminded us that “deportation may result in the loss ‘of all that makes 
life worth living.’” 
 21. Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86 (1903); Aslam v. 
Mukasey, 537 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 22. While this has been interpreted as a constitutional mandate since the mid-
1950s, see Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212 (1953), claims of self-incrimination in 
immigration proceedings are limited to admissions concerning actions that constitute a 
crime, see Laqui v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 422 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1970).  
In addition, in 1960, the Ninth Circuit Court held that “[a] coerced confession was 
inadmissible a deportation hearing.” Bong Youn Choy v. Varber, 279 F.2d 642, 646 (9th 
Cir. 1960). 
 23. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessey, 342 U.S. 580, 581 (1952); American-Arab 
Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1989), rev’d on 
other grounds, 940 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1991). 
SCHARF ARTICLE - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/9/2010  2:01 PM 
 
62 
right to counsel (Sixth Amendment),24 are generally provided to 
immigrants. 
It may not be surprising, then, that the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause, rather than the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule is 
more frequently the successful theory upon which evidence offered at 
removal hearings is excluded.25  The test applied in these cases is the 
same as that used in other due process cases—whether the evidence is 
both probative and fundamentally fair.26 
B. Interpretations of Fourth Amendment Depend on Circuit in 
 Which an Immigration Court Sits 
While the Supreme Court’s rule in Lopez-Mendoza still governs 
removal proceedings, and has resulted in the general unavailability of 
the exclusionary rule in these hearings,27 over the years since several 
federal courts of appeals have tackled the question as to what the Court 
meant by the phrase “egregious violations.” Accordingly, for cases 
involving egregious violations of these rights as defined by the various 
federal courts of appeals, these courts have begun to employ what 
appears to be an “exception” to the general principle of Fourth 
Amendment non-applicability outlined in Lopez-Mendoza.28 The problem 
 
 24. This right has been granted through regulation, not an interpretation based on 
the Sixth Amendment, and only so long as the non-citizen pays for the attorney.   In 
addition, grounded in the Due Process Clause, it has been recognized as applicable to 
removal cases.  Waldron v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 17 F.3d 511, 517 (2nd 
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1014 (1994). 
 25. See Bustos-Torres v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 898 F.2d 1053, 1058 
(5th Cir. 1990) (shifting burden to respondent to prove non-deportability once the 
government has met its burden of proving deportability does not abridge Fifth Amendment 
rights supports an inference that respondents do have Fifth Amendment rights in 
deportation proceedings); Pinto-Montoya v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2008); 
Aslam v. Mukasey, 537 F. 3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2008) (affirming use of video testimony); 
Navia–Duran v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 568 F.2d 803, 810 (1st Cir. 1977); 
In re Garcia, 17 I. & N. Dec. 319, 321 (B.I.A. 1980); In re Toro, 17 I. & N. Dec. 340, 
343 (B.I.A. 1980).  A search for precedent relying exclusively on the Fifth Amendment 
produced limited results beyond the two Second Circuit and the two BIA cases mentioned 
herein. 
 26. Aslam, 537 F.3d at 114. 
 27. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 
(1984). 
 28. Others, such as the First Circuit, seem wedded to the more stringent rule.  For 
example, in 2006, in the case of Kandamar v. Gonzales, the Court seemed to attempt to 
go further than Lopez-Mendoza when it refused to suppress the respondent’s passport 
alleged to have been improperly seized by DHS in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  
Kandamar v. Gonzalez, 464 F.3d 65, 74 (1st Cir. 2006).  While the Court acknowledged that 
“the seizure is troubling,” it nonetheless required, for suppression, that the respondent 
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that has been caused by, first, the vague Supreme Court language, and 
second, that vague language now being interpreted differently by different 
courts, is apparent—a lack of uniformity in the interpretation and 
implementation of an important civil right and principle of federal law.  
For, depending on the location of an immigration court, immigration 
judges will apply principles deriving from the circuit court in their district.  
A survey of recent opinions from various courts of appeals demonstrates 
this problem. 
In 2006, the First Circuit Court of Appeals, in Kandamar v. Gonzales, 
acknowledged and adopted an egregiousness exception to the non-
applicability of the exclusionary rule even though it denied suppression 
in concluding that the gathering of evidence against the respondent did 
not involve misconduct through threats, coercion, or physical abuse.29 
There is more jurisprudence in the Second Circuit.  In 2006, the Court 
in Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales denied suppression even though the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officer had no valid reason for 
the stop or the request for identification. Nonetheless, the Court outlined 
a sliding scale test to apply to the proffered evidence: a seizure suffered 
for no reason would be considered an egregious violation only if it was 
sufficiently severe, or if the stop was based on race or another “grossly 
improper consideration.”30  In offering guidance as to what might render 
a seizure gross or unreasonable, the Court mentioned both a “particularly 
lengthy” initial illegal stop and the show or use of force.31 
But when the Second Circuit spoke again on this issue two years later, 
in a case not involving race, the Court permitted use of challenged 
evidence.  In Melnitsenko v. Mukasey,32 an Estonian woman who 
overstayed her non-immigrant visa was questioned by U.S. Immigration 
 
demonstrate prejudice and harmful error resulting from the seizure.  Without this, the Court 
refused to find that the respondent was a victim of egregious government misconduct.  Id. 
 29. Id. at 71-72. 
 30. Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006).  There was no 
evidence in this case that race played a part in the stop.  Victims of racial discrimination in 
removal should also benefit by an equal protection argument in which the exclusionary 
rule would apply unless the government could demonstrate at least an important state 
interest for using the evidence.  See Wong, supra note 6. 
 31. Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d at 236.  In this case, although the 
respondent stated in his affidavit that he was stopped based solely on his race, he offered 
no evidence besides his affidavit to support his claim.  When there was no evidence of 
either a lengthy stop or a show of force, the court found a lack of egregious violation of 
the Fourth Amendment, and did not suppress the evidence in question. 
 32. Melnitsenko v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for several hours during a traffic stop 
near the Vermont border.  The Court held the facts to be insufficiently 
“severe” to constitute an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment.  
Nonetheless, it emphasized that Melnitsenko was “neither arrested nor 
taken to jail,”33 perhaps supporting an inference that had she been, the 
case may have been decided differently.  In the same year,  in Pinto-
Montoya v. Mukasey, the Second Circuit determined that while it 
generally did not favor suppression, it would employ it when it found 
that “an egregious violation that was fundamentally unfair had occurred, 
or that the violation . . . undermined the reliability of the evidence,”34 
Finally, in 2009, the Second Circuit came upon a case whose facts 
induced it to suppress a statement it found to be unreliable.35  In Singh v. 
Mukasey,36 the Court ruled that the immigration judge’s adverse 
credibility determination of Singh was undermined and improper when 
Mr. Singh, a permanent resident in removal proceedings on charges of 
attempted smuggling after he and a friend attempted to re-enter the 
United States at Buffalo from Canada following their visit to a strip club, 
had not been advised of his rights until near the interview’s completion, 
several hours into the detention; he was not informed of his rights until 
after the statement was taken.37  The Court reiterated the applicability of 
the Fifth Amendment’s due process protections in deportation 
proceedings,38 and mentioned Lopez-Mendoza’s reluctance to sanction a 
general application of the exclusionary rule in these cases.  But it then 
invoked Lopez-Mendoza’s failure to specify the occasions in which 
exclusion is warranted because of “egregious violations of Fourth 
Amendment or other liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental 
fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained.”39  
The Court took on that issue in ruling that Mr. Singh’s statement, being 
unreliable, should have been suppressed.40 The Court reiterated that 
 
 33.  Id. at 48.  Further, the Court would not necessarily require either physical abuse or 
threats of violence in order to find “severe” and therefore “egregious” violation of the 
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 47.  The acronym “ICE” in the prior sentence refers to the 
Department of Homeland Security’s division of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 
 34. Pinto-Montoya v. Mukase, 540 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Almeida-
Amaral, 461 F.3d at 235). 
 35. Singh v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 36. Id. at 209-11, 213. 
 37. Id. at 213. 
 38. Id. at 214-15 (citing, among others, Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147, 154 
(1945)). 
 39. Id. at 215 (citing Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 
U.S. 1032, 1050-51 (1984)). 
 40. Id. 
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“exclusion of evidence is appropriate” ‘if . . . evidence established either 
(a) that an egregious violation that was fundamentally unfair had 
occurred or (b) that the violation—regardless of its egregiousness or 
unfairness—undermined the reliability of the evidence in dispute.’”41  In 
addition, it recited, from Almedia-Amaral, that “[e]ven assuming that the 
conduct here was not ‘egregious,’ it nonetheless ‘undermined the 
reliability of the evidence in dispute.’”42 
As is usually the case, in the end, the decision turned on its facts: Mr. 
Singh had been held for four to five hours in the early morning, while 
armed uniformed officers were circulating; he was repeatedly told he 
was going to jail, had not slept for about twenty-four hours by the time 
of his release, testified that he had not read the statement he was asked to 
sign, that it contained admissions he never made, that he was in custody 
during this time while both his permanent resident card and his car had 
been taken from him by the officers,43 “that it was unclear when he was 
informed of his right to speak with an attorney or of his other rights, and 
that the officer testified that she did not see Mr. Singh sign the statement 
and did not witness any officer informing him of his rights until “at least 
a few hours had gone by.”44  At its conclusion, the Court distinguished 
this case from others in which it had affirmed denials of suppression, 
noting that in those cases, the evidence was reliable, as it related to 
simple objective facts, such as whether a person was a foreign citizen or 
had a passport or valid visa.45  “These facts are not altered by coercive 
interrogation—a person either is or is not a citizen.”46  But “[i]n this 
case, the underlying issue—whether Mr. Singh knew that Mr. Bedi, 
although a Canadian citizen with permission to enter the United States, 
was entering the country in violation of law by virtue of his intent to 
continue working in the United States without authorization—is more 
nuanced and susceptible to corruption during the course of an improper 
interview.”47  Given that “in this extraordinary case . . . the government 
 
 41. Id. (citing Pinto-Montoya v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
 42. Id. (citing Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 215-16. 
 45. Id. at 216. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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has failed to demonstrate by the requisite level of proof,” it vacated the 
BIA’s order of removal and remanded the case for further proceedings.48 
Did the Second Circuit alter its concept of the Fourth Amendment 
between 2008 and 2009, or was it simply that the facts in the Singh case 
appeared to be more egregious than were those in Melnitsenko?  No one 
can know. 
In 2005, the Sixth Circuit failed to suppress evidence in United States 
v. Navarro-Diaz,49 when questions were raised concerning the 
admissibility of a defendant’s name and date of birth garnered during an 
allegedly unconstitutional detention.  Though denying relief, the Court 
did give a nod to the egregious violation theory of Lopez-Mendoza but, 
like that Court, the Sixth Circuit indicated that Navarro-Diaz was not a 
victim of an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment50 given his 
situation: Navarro-Diaz encountered the police not in a random attempt 
to determine whether he was in the country illegally, but as the result of 
his being in a hotel room in the middle of the day with four other local 
men, at least one of whom was smoking marijuana.  All were asked to 
identify themselves, not just those who appeared Hispanic.51 
Other circuits appear to be changing their approach to the issue.  
While in 2001, the Eighth Circuit applied the exclusionary rule to 
exclude from a removal hearing fingerprint evidence gathered as a result 
of an unlawful arrest, citing Supreme Court precedent to support its 
conclusion,52  the same Court, in 2005, applied the rule, this time in a 
criminal case, to determine that ICE could not “take custody of a person 
and fingerprint him without any admissible reason to believe the person 
is an illegal alien.”53  In excluding the fingerprint evidence, the Court 
stated that “such a custodial detention without justification offends the 
Fourth Amendment, and therefore, the fingerprints and statements obtained 
as a result of the detention must be suppressed.”54  The case involved 
detention of respondent following questioning by local law enforcement 
officers for undetermined reasons. When it became evident that he 
primarily spoke Spanish, the officers called an agent of the U.S. Border 
Patrol to interpret.  During that period, the respondent allegedly admitted 
that he was in the U.S. without authorization, even though there was no 
 
 48. Id. at 217. 
 49. United States v. Navarro-Diaz, 540 F.3d 581, 585 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 50. Id. at 587. 
 51. Id. 
 52. United States v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 754-57 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 53. United States v. Flores-Sandoval, 422 F.3d 711, 712 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 54. Id. at 712. 
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indication that he had received Miranda warnings prior to his statement. 
After spending the night in the local jail, he was transported to the ICE 
office, still in custody.  When his fingerprints were scanned and it was 
learned that he had previously been deported, he was indicted for re-
entry following deportation.55  The Court ruled that the detention had 
been unconstitutional, thus finding that the evidence should be excluded, 
as it was “obtained by exploitation of [an unlawful detention] instead of 
by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.”56  
To the government’s assertion that the detention was constitutional 
because the respondent admitted to being in the U.S. illegally, thereby 
providing ICE a basis for detention, the Court disagreed,57 as there 
was no indication that the respondent had been given Miranda warnings 
before making the inculpatory statements and the government offered 
nothing to support its claim that ICE had reason to believe he was in the 
U.S. illegally based on anything other than his own statement to the 
Border Patrol. “Because the government was able to demonstrate no 
constitutional justification for detaining Flores-Sandoval,” the Court 
said, “the District Court did not err in granting his motion to suppress his 
fingerprint evidence and statements.”58  Holding that “statements that 
result from an illegal detention are not admissible,”59  the Court noted 
that the government failed to show that respondent’s statement was 
made in circumstances that make its use permissible, as the government, 
here acting through the Border Patrol, offered no evidence to justify 
detaining respondent in the first place.60  While the Court was well 
 
 55. Id. at 713. 
 56. Id. at 714 (citing Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d at 755). 
 57. Id. (quoting United States v. Hernandez-Hernandez, 384 F.3d 562, 565 (8th 
Cir. 2004)). 
 58. Id. at 715.  The Court noted that after disposition of this appeal, ICE could issue a 
detainer on respondent to retake custody because as a jurisdictional rather than an evidentiary 
matter, his body and identity could not be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree (citing 
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1984)).  The 
Court opined that this would happen as a result of civil deportation proceedings, so while 
their decision was of limited value to Flores-Sandoval, the Court applied well-established 
Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit precedent and reached “a result that has a somewhat 
academic feel to it.  Yet we believe there is value in reminding the government that it 
must do things ‘the right way.’  Our holding today serves that important interest.” Id. (citing 
Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d at 753, 756). 
 59. Id. at 714 (citing United States v. Hernandez-Hernandez, 384 F.3d 562, 565 (8th 
Cir. 2004)). 
 60. Id. at 714-15.  The court also held that its outcome should be the same as it was 
in United States v. Guevara-Martinez, which held that fingerprint evidence is subject to the 
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aware of the fact that, subsequent to the disposition of the appeal, ICE 
would likely issue a detainer to retake the respondent’s custody,61  “[a]s 
a practical matter, our decision is of very limited value to Flores-
Sandoval.  The decision simply applies well-established Supreme Court 
and Eighth Circuit precedent and admittedly reaches a result that has a 
somewhat academic feel to it.  Yet we believe there is value in reminding 
the government that it must do things ‘the right way.’  Our holding today 
serves that important interest.”62 
In the Ninth Circuit, as in the others, while the Court has been more 
likely to find the egregiousness to which it believed Lopez-Mendoza 
referred in cases involving immigration-related stops made based on the 
respondent’s race, its views of egregiousness in other scenarios were 
generally limited until recently.  In 1985, a year following Lopez-
Mendoza, in a case that did not involve race, the Court reflected the 
Supreme Court’s view of the Fourth Amendment and deportation 
proceedings when it stated that “the exclusionary rule is inapplicable in 
civil deportation proceedings in the absence of any showing that the 
officer’s conduct would undermine the credibility of the challenged 
evidence.”63  Here was evident the Court’s view that excluding evidence 
would be the exception to the rule.  Further, as to egregiousness, the 
Court offered a particularly limited view, requiring evidence that officers’ 
actions “undermined the probative value of petitioner’s statements” by 
causing the statements to have been made involuntarily or as the result 
of duress or coercion.64  By 1994, when the Court suppressed evidence 
gathered as a result of a stop it determined had been based solely on the 
respondent’s Hispanic appearance,65 it held that egregiousness was proved, 
as the stop was made in bad faith and constituted an egregious violation 
of the Fourth Amendment. 
As the years progressed, the Ninth Circuit developed a broader view 
of excludability.  For example, by 2008, the Court began ordering the 
 
exclusionary rule and thus, given that evidence did not support an assumption that the 
respondent consented to the taking of his fingerprints.  Id. at 715 (citing Guevara-Martinez, 
262 F.3d at 755-57).  Also, the fingerprints were taken during a custodial detention by 
ICE that has not been constitutionally justified. Id. at 715. 
 61. This is because, “as a jurisdictional rather than an evidentiary matter, his body 
and identity cannot be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.” Id. (citing Guevara-
Martinez, 262 F.3d at 756). 
 62. Id. (quoting Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d at 756). 
 63. Cervantes-Cuevas v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 797 F.2d 707, 711 
(9th Cir. 1985) (emphasis supplied). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Gonzalez-Rivera v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 22 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 
1994). 
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exclusion of any evidence obtained either as the result of a deliberate 
violation of the Fourth Amendment or as the result of conduct that a 
reasonable officer should have known violated the Constitution.66  The 
Board of Immigration Appeals understands that the Ninth Circuit’s view 
of the exclusionary rule is broader than the standard adopted by both the 
BIA67 and the First and Second Circuits.68 
To summarize, while it is difficult to identify a unified test that is 
applied to determine whether evidence being offered against a non-
citizen at a removal hearing should be excluded, to date, there is no case 
law that helps determine either the precise quantum or quality of evidence 
the government must proffer to justify evidentiary admission in a removal 
case.69  Nonetheless, based on the assumption that the evidence should at 
least meet the level required of respondents to meet their prima facie 
case, Matter of Barcenas instructs us that the government must make 
reasonable attempts to produce supporting testimony from agents with 
knowledge of the events.70  While this requirement furthers the general 
principles of fundamental fairness and reflects that due process is afforded 
to those in removal proceedings,71 the relevant regulations, requiring an 
immigration judge to receive into evidence “any oral or written statement 
that is material and relevant to any issue in the case,”72 arguably imply a 
lower standard of proof for admissibility.  Nonetheless, the regulation is 
tempered by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which mandates 
 
 66. Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012, 1019 (9th Cir. 2008), reh’g en 
banc denied sub nom. Lopez-Rodriguez v. Holder, 560 F.3d 1098, 1099 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(citing Adamson v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 745 F.2d 541, 545 (9th Cir. 1984)); see 
Orhorhaghe v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 38 F.3d 488, 504 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(affirming the Immigration Judge’s suppression of a passport and Form I-94 seized in an 
egregious violation of constitutional rights involving both a race-based stop and invasive 
search techniques). 
 67. This rule was adopted in In re Cervantes-Torres, 21 I. & N. Dec. 351, 353 
(B.I.A. 1996). 
 68. The First Circuit’s test was described in Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 
71-72 (2006) (denying a motion to suppress and concluding that “egregious” misconduct 
by government agents was that which involves threats, coercion, or physical abuse); the 
Second Circuit’s test was explained in Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d at 236 
(denying motion to suppress fruits of illegal stop during which respondent was asked for 
identification; a seizure was egregious if it is grossly unreasonable or “sufficiently severe”). 
 69. See In Removal Proceedings, supra note 1, at *12. 
 70. In re Barcenas, 19 I. & N. Dec. 609, 611 (B.I.A 1988). 
 71. See United States v. Barraza-Leon, 575 F.2d 218, 220 (9th Cir. 1978); Singh v. 
Mukasey, 553 F.3d 207, 214 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 72. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.7(a) (2010). 
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that a non-citizen in removal proceedings “shall have a reasonable 
opportunity to examine the evidence against [him/her] . . . and to cross-
examine witnesses presented by the Government.”73  Thus, an immigration 
judge’s admission of unsupported evidence may constitute a due process 
violation if its inclusion prejudices the respondent.74 
III. JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO REGULATORY VIOLATIONS GOVERNING 
DETENTION AND DEPORTATION PROCEDURES 
Given that courts have hesitated to invoke the Constitution to regulate 
evidence introduced at immigration hearings, relying instead, as did the 
Court in Lopez-Mendoza, on the assumption that the regulations 
pertinent to collecting evidence will be honored, it should be instructive 
to review the value of that reliance.  Various regulations promulgated 
pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) govern the role 
of arresting officers, warrants, and other details concerning apprehension 
and detention of suspected immigration law violators.  For example, 
while INA § 287(a)(2) allows authorized officers to arrest without 
warrant “any alien in the United States, if he has reason to believe that 
the alien, so arrested is in the United States, in violation of any such law 
or regulation and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for 
his arrest;”  8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(1) specifies that “[o]nly designated 
immigration officers are authorized to make an arrest.”  Further, 8 C.F.R.    
§ 287.8(c)(2)(i) requires that “[a]n arrest shall only be made when the 
designated immigration officer has reason to believe that the person 
arrested has committed an offense against the United States or is an alien 
illegally in the United States.”  8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(ii) sets out details 
as to when a warrant is required: “A warrant of arrest shall be obtained 
except when the designated immigration officer has reason to believe 
that the person is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.” 
Finally, 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(iii) requires an officer to identify himself 
or herself as an immigration officer authorized to make an arrest, and to 
state that the person is under arrest and the reason for the arrest. 
While it is true that not all regulatory violations in the immigration 
arena are held to be grounds to dismiss related removal charges,75 some 
 
 73. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 240(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b) 
(4)(B) (2006). 
 74. See Farrokhi v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 900 F. 2d 697, 702 (4th 
Cir. 1990) (finding a due process violation based on lack of counsel); see also Marku v. 
Board of Immigration Appeals, No. 03-40871, 2005 WL 1162978, at *1 (2d Cir. May 
16, 2005). 
 75. See Lin v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 459 F.3d 255, 267-72 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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courts have considered such violations, especially when occasioned by 
arresting officers, to warrant dismissal.76  An early and poignant statement 
on this question worth recalling here was issued by the Supreme Court in 
1945, when it held in Bridges v. Wixon that a violation of an immigration 
regulation intended to protect noncitizens from unfair procedures in 
deportation proceedings should result in a dismissal in a case involving 
improperly introduced hearsay on the key issue in the case.  The Court 
emphasized the crucial importance of making correct deportation decisions 
when it said: 
Here the liberty of an individual is at stake.  Highly incriminating statements are 
used against him—statements which were unsworn and which under the governing 
regulation are inadmissible.  We are dealing here with procedural requirements 
prescribed for the protection of the alien.  Though deportation is not technically 
a criminal proceeding, it visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives 
him of the right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom.  That deportation 
is a penalty—at times a most serious one—cannot be doubted.  Meticulous care 
must be exercised lest the procedure by which he is deprived of that liberty not 
meet the essential standards of fairness.77 
Nearly ten years later, in United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy,78 
the Supreme Court held more broadly that an administrative agency 
must adhere to its own regulations.  This principle neither died with 
Bridges nor was limited to the particular procedural objections of that 
case.  Rather, it remains alive today, and is evident in the 1977 First 
Circuit case of Navia-Duran v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,79 
which vacated a deportation order because of noncompliance with a 
regulation requiring that statements used as evidence must be in writing 
and under oath, and that the respondent’s signature be requested.  That 
Court indicated that the case reminded us that the I.N.S.-established 
procedures should be followed at deportation hearings,80 and that these 
procedures are supported by regulations found in the Code of Federal 
 
In Lin, the court did reverse the BIA’s order of removal in a Chinese asylum case after a 
violation of a regulation that prohibited disclosure of confidential information that put 
the petitioner at risk of persecution if returned to China. 
 76. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) (deportation based on union organizer’s 
alleged membership in the Communist Party). 
 77. Id. at 154. 
 78. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1954). 
 79. Navia-Duran v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 568 F.2d 803, 808 (1st Cir. 
1977). 
 80. This can be found at 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1970). 
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Regulations.81  The Court quoted the statement from Bridges v. Wixon 
cited above, and reiterated its belief that compliance with regulations is 
an essential safeguard of a non-citizen’s right to due process,82 a rule that 
“evolved in the context of civil, not criminal, proceedings.”83 
The analogies to both Bridges and Accardi were evident to the court 
ruling on Navia-Duran, particularly when it highlighted the principle, 
affirmed by the regulation,84 that one “arrested without a warrant . . . 
must be advised of his right to legal representation at a deportation hearing 
and of the possible use of his statement in a subsequent proceeding.”85  
“Expulsion,” the Court said, “cannot turn upon utterances cudgeled from 
the alien by governmental authorities; statements made by the alien and 
used to achieve his deportation must be voluntarily given.”86 
Finally, the court indicated its agreement that the “old Supreme Court 
dictum [from Bilokumsky to Tod, that the rule against involuntary 
confessions should not apply in deportation proceedings] has been 
undercut by later cases which recognize that the rule against involuntary 
confessions is an essential element of due process.”87 
Other circuits have been equally deferential to the axiom that enacted 
regulations must be followed, especially in removal hearings where 
respondents do not benefit by the full panoply of rights accorded 
criminal defendants.  Nearly forty years after Accardi, in 1991, the 
Second Circuit adopted its doctrine in Montilla v. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, when it held that “[t]he failure of the [BIA] and 
of the Department of Justice to follow their own established procedures 
[constituted] reversible error.”88  So, while the respondent in the 1993 
Second Circuit case of Waldron v. Immigration and Naturalization 
Service was unsuccessful in challenging the refusal to allow him to 
contact his own consulate, the court nonetheless established that 
Waldron would have succeeded had he proved either that the applicable 
regulation been “promulgated to protect a fundamental right derived 
 
 81. In this case, the regulations are found at 8 C.F.R. § 242 (1977). 
 82. Navia-Duran, 568 F.2d at 809. 
 83. Id. (citing Smith v. Resor, 406 F.2 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1969)). 
 84. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 (2010). 
 85. Navia-Duran, 568 F.2d at 809. 
 86. Id. at 810.  It is true that in United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, the Supreme 
Court stated that an essential element of due process must be absent in order to render a 
deportation hearing unfair. 263 U.S. 149, 157 (1923). 
 87. Navia-Duran, 568 F.2d at 811.  The Court also cited Chambers v. Florida, 309 
U.S. 227, 240-41 (1940). 
 88. Montilla v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 926 F.2d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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from the Constitution or federal statute,” or that he had suffered 
prejudice to the rights sought to be protected by the regulation.89 
IV. THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS AND THE                             
FOURTH AMENDMENT 
A. Analysis of Past Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions 
At the outset, a little background should be helpful for those 
unfamiliar with the administrative review tribunal for immigration cases.  
The Board of Immigration Appeals, commonly known as the BIA, has a 
heavy caseload; in fiscal year 2003, for example, it decided over 44,000 
appeals.90  Of those cases, more than 12,000 reached the federal circuit 
courts of appeals.91  Unfortunately, the BIA publishes only a few of its 
decisions, selected by a majority of the Board members to have precedential 
value.92  Most of its decisions remain unpublished and while they used to 
be accompanied by short explanations, since 1999, they have also included 
“affirmances without opinion,” known commonly as “AWOs,” terse 
decisions without any reasoning.93  Thus, it is difficult to view these 
cases as an entity in order to ascertain the BIA’s views on particular issues. 
 
 89. Waldron v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 17 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1993), 
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1014 (1994). 
 90. Edward R. Grant, Laws of Intended Consequences: IIRAIRA and Other Unsung 
Contributors to the Current State of Immigration Litigation, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 923, 925 
(2006). 
 91. Id. 
 92. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2010); see also THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID 
A. MARTIN & HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 
251-55 (West, 5th ed. 2003); 1 Charles Gordon, Stanley Mailman & Stephen Yale-Loehr, 
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 3.24[2][c] (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2010). 
 93. See John R.B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr, & Elizabeth Cronin, Why are 
So Many People Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court?  An 
Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 
18-19 (2005); see also Katie R. Eyer Administrative Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 
60 ADMIN. L. REV. 647, 676-77 (Summer 2008) (“[T]he number of precedential decisions 
issued by the Board . . . decreased dramatically in the years following 1999.  In FY 1999, 
just prior to the issuance of the first set of streamlining regulations, the BIA issued forty 
five precedential decisions, a number fairly consistent with its historical practice.  During 
the following three years, the number of precedential decisions issued each year fell to 
the mid-twenties.  In FY 2003, 2004, and 2005, following the issuance of the 2002 
streamlining regulations, the number of precedential decisions fell even further, with an 
all-time low number . . . five–being issued in 2004 . . . considered as a proportion of the total 
number of cases decided by the BIA. . . . [Prior to the streamlining,] approximately 0.256% 
of BIA appeals resulted in published precedential decisions[,] . . . [while] following the 
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Having said that, for the past nearly thirty years, the Board has, at least 
in its precedent cases,94 followed the federal courts of appeals’ rulings on 
the Fourth Amendment and the issue of egregiousness and has held that 
evidence obtained as a result of violations of the Fourth Amendment 
may constitute violations of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, 
and is thus suppressible if that evidence would adversely affect the 
fundamental fairness of an immigration proceeding.95  In spite of that 
holding, the occasions on which the BIA has ruled that evidence should 
be suppressed have been notably few in number.  For example, the Index 
to BIA Precedent Decisions Volume 22 categorizes decisions involving 
the exclusionary rule under the general topic “Evidence.”  While this 
volume includes Interim Decisions 2526-3540, covering BIA precedent 
cases from 1976–2009, only six of these cases concerned the applicability 
of the exclusionary rule.  Of those six cases, in only two, Matter of Garcia 
and Matter of Toro,96 do we find the BIA discussing the exclusionary 
rule in light of either the Fourth or Fifth Amendment considerations.97 
Historically, the BIA has been even less concerned with regulatory 
violations, adopting the restrictive “prejudice” test in 1980 when deciding 
whether deportation proceedings should be invalidated following a 
regulatory violation.98  In that year, it found substantial compliance with 
 
1999 and 2002 streamlining regulations, . . . 0.066% of BIA appeals result[ed] in published 
precedential decisions in 2001 and a mere 0.010% [in 2004].”). 
 94. Three-member panels decide precedential cases. See BOARD OF IMMIGRATION 
PRACTICE MANUAL, ch. 1.3(a)(i) (rev. Apr. 1, 2008), available at http:// www.usdoj.gov/ 
eoir/bia/qapracmanual/apptmtn4.htm (“[A] single Board Member decides cases unless 
the case falls into one of six categories that require a decision by a panel of three Board 
Members [such as] the need to establish a precedent construing the meaning of laws, 
regulations or procedures.”).  Moreover, only “selected decisions of the Board rendered 
by a three-member panel or by the Board en banc may be designated to serve as 
precedents.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2010).  Further, “[u]npublished decisions are binding on 
the parties to the decision but are not considered precedent for unrelated cases.” BOARD 
OF IMMIGRATION PRACTICE MANUAL, ch. 1.4(d)(ii) (rev. Apr. 1, 2008). Because unpublished 
decisions lack precedential value, courts have declined to give them deferential treatment 
under Chevron. See Chan v. Reno, 113 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 1997) (refusing to 
defer to an unpublished disposition that, “by the INS’s own regulations . . . carr[ies] no 
precedential weight”).  However, there is disagreement on this issue.  See Garcia-Quintero v. 
Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1011-14 (9th Cir. 2006) (denying Chevron deference to a non-
precedential BIA decision but emphasizing that Chevron deference may apply where the 
non-precedential decision relied on and was “compelled by” an earlier precedential decision). 
 95. In re Toro, 17 I. & N. Dec. 340, 343 (B.I.A. 1980). 
 96. Id.; In re Garcia, 17 I. & N. Dec. 319 (B.I.A. 1980). 
 97. In re Garcia, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 319; In re Toro, 17 I. & N. Dec.  at 343. 
 98. In re Garcia-Flores, 17 I. &. N. Dec. 325, 329 (B.I.A. 1980) (“[W]here agency 
action has been invalidated by the Supreme Court there has either been an expressed or clearly 
apparent prejudice to the individual as a result of a violation of a rule or regulation 
promulgated at least in part to bestow a procedural or substantive benefit on the individual in 
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a regulation requiring that respondents be informed that statements made 
could be used in subsequent proceedings, where the record did not reflect 
that the respondent was so advised, but where the forms respondent 
signed advised him, “in both English and Spanish, of his right to consult 
a lawyer and his right to ask for a hearing to determine his right to remain in 
the United States.”99  In 1991 the prejudice standard was disavowed after 
the Second Circuit held that relief for a non-citizen claiming the I.N.S. 
had failed to adhere to its own regulations in a deportation hearing was 
not predicated on proof of prejudice; rather, all that need be shown was 
that the I.N.S. violated regulations intended for the applicant’s benefit.100 
The paucity of precedential BIA cases undoubtedly hampers research 
into the suppression issue.101 Further, the federal courts of appeals’ 
continuing divergence as to what constitutes egregious conduct by 
government agents vis-à-vis immigration detainees has seemingly proved 
a challenge for the BIA as well, which finds itself applying different 
tests in different cases, depending on the law of the circuit in which the 
case originated.  For example, in the recent case of Matter of Sanchez-
Lopez arising in the Ninth Circuit (though an unpublished case), the BIA 
applied that Circuit’s egregious violation rule, which is broader than that 
of the First or Second Circuit.102 
 
question. Where compliance with the regulation is mandated by the Constitution, prejudice 
may be presumed. Similarly, where an entire procedural framework, designed to insure the 
fair processing of an action affecting an individual is created but then not followed by an 
agency, it can be deemed prejudicial (citations omitted).  As a general rule, however, 
prejudice will have to be specifically demonstrated.”). 
 99. In re Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I. & N. Dec. 503, 506 (B.I.A. 1980). 
 100. Montilla v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 926 F.2d 162, 169 (2d Cir. 
1991).  It could be argued that Montilla only meant to disavow the ‘prejudice’ in cases 
involving alleged violations of regulations regarding the right to counsel in immigration 
hearings. See, e.g., id. 
 101. A conversation with the BIA Library staff in Falls Church, Virginia confirmed 
that statistics are not generated by the BIA comparing the number of published cases 
with the total number decided.  A staff member indicated that the current volume of the 
BIA’s indexed decisions, volume 24, includes decisions from 2009 through the present 
(mid-March 2010), during which time only 32 decisions have been deemed to 
carry precedential value.  Some scholarly works attempt to get at these baseline figures.  
See, e.g., John R.B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr, & Elizabeth Cronin, Why Are So 
Many People Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? 
An Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
1 (2005). 
 102. In re Sanchez-Lopez, No. A094-810-418, (B.I.A. May 7, 2009), available at 
www.bibdaily.com (search Sanchez-Lopez). 
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In a manner similar to the federal courts of appeals, in the years since 
Lopez-Mendoza, the BIA has relied not upon the Fourth Amendment, 
but upon the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause when it encountered 
challenged evidence that lacked both probative value and fundamental 
fairness.103  In fact, in 1979, it terminated proceedings after finding that a 
respondent’s admissions, which formed the basis for the government’s 
case, were based on coerced and involuntary statements, thereby violating 
due process.104  In light of that decision, when a different respondent lost 
an appeal on the grounds of allegedly tainted evidence the following 
year, the BIA did reaffirm that “circumstances surrounding an arrest and 
interrogation . . .  may in some cases render evidence inadmissible under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”105 
As to the Fourth Amendment, the 1979 case of Matter of Sandoval 
confirmed the BIA’s canon that the exclusionary rule did not apply in 
deportation proceedings.106  A year later it reaffirmed this conclusion, in 
a statement eerily akin to Lopez-Mendoza in its first blush denial of the 
Fourth Amendment, when the BIA iterated that “evidence resulting from 
a search and seizure in violation of Fourth Amendment rights is not . . . 
excludable from civil deportation proceedings.”107  In Matter of Toro, 
the BIA actually found that the officers’ conduct during the arrest and 
interrogation breached the respondent’s Fourth Amendment rights; in 
affirming the deportation, the Tribunal reasoned that the procedures 
employed were not prohibited at the time in which they were engaged, 
as the incident had taken place nearly a year before the Supreme Court 
ruled them to be unconstitutional.108 
It was not until 1996 that the BIA specifically acknowledged the 
Lopez-Mendoza mandate that evidence produced at deportation hearings 
 
 103. Trias Trias-Hernandez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 528 F.2d 366, 
369 (9th Cir. 1975); In re Toro, 17 I. & N. Dec. 340, 343 (B.I.A. 1980). 
 104. In re Garcia, 17 I. & N. Dec. 319, 320-21 (B.I.A. 1980) (finding that admission 
of alienage was made only after officers led respondent to believe he was going to be 
deported, that he had no rights, including none to speak with counsel, and that he could 
be detained without explanation). 
 105. In re Toro, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 343 (citing In re Garcia, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 319). 
 106. In re Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70, 77 (B.I.A. 1979). There is an odd statement 
appearing as dictum in Sandoval to the effect that respondent’s admission at the hearing 
concerning her alienage was elicited from her after she was improperly not informed of 
her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  As a result, the admission was 
disregarded. Id. at 72. The appropriate inference drawn here is that the court assumed this 
privilege to be applicable in deportation proceedings, regardless of whether the statement 
would have subjected the respondent to criminal liability. 
 107. In re Toro, 17 I. & N. Dec., at 343 (citing In re Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70 
(B.I.A. 1979)). 
 108. Id. at 343-44 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975)). 
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which derived from egregious violations of Fourth Amendment rights 
must be excluded.109 
Because it is difficult to draw supportable conclusions as to the BIA’s 
jurisprudence from so few cases, I conducted additional research into the 
BIA’s opinions on this topic, which led to cases the BIA chose not to 
assign precedential value.  At the risk of discipline for citing and discussing 
unpublished cases,110  I will do just that; otherwise, my attempt to draw 
conclusions about the BIA’s views on this issue would be fruitless.111 
In one non-precedential case from May 2009, the BIA affirmed the 
termination of removal proceedings where, following an illegal search 
and seizure, detention, and interrogation by immigration agents, the 
respondent admitted alienage.112  In that case, originating in California 
and thus controlled by the Ninth Circuit’s jurisprudence on the issues of 
egregiousness,113 there was first an illegal stop; next when the respondent 
was subjected to a pat search, agents found respondent’s wallet, which 
produced evidence of alienage; subsequently, during respondent’s detention 
and interrogation, he admitted his alienage.  The court reasoned that, 
under the Ninth Circuit’s rule (being broader than that of the BIA), the 
evidence recovered during the pat search needed to be excluded because 
“a reasonable officer should have known that a pat search of the respondent 
and the act of reaching into the respondent’s pocket and removing his 
identification card from his wallet, [sic] would be a violation of the 
respondent’s Fourth Amendment rights.”114 
More recently, in October 2009, operating on the theory that “egregious 
violations of Fourth Amendment rights that transgress notions of 
 
 109. In re Cervantes-Torres, 21 I. & N. Dec. 351, 353 (B.I.A. 1996) (denying relief, 
as the voluntary admissions were not the result of the illegal arrest). 
 110. In one case the court  actually raised the possibility of discipline for a lawyer who 
cited to an unpublished case.  Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1180 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 111. This lack of a stock of precedential cases discourages effective client counseling 
and almost assures a level of law practice far below that which ethical, diligent attorneys 
strive for and are expected to attain. 
 112. In re Sanchez-Lopez, No. A094-810-418, (B.I.A. May 7, 2009), available at 
www.bibdaily.com (search Sanchez-Lopez). 
 113. Requiring exclusion of any evidence obtained as the result of a deliberate 
violation of the Fourth Amendment or as the result of conduct that a reasonable officer 
should have known violates the Constitution.  In this case the BIA agreed with the IJ that 
a reasonable officer should have known that a pat search of the respondent and reaching 
into the respondent’s pocket and removing his identification card from his wallet would 
be a violation of the respondent’s Fourth Amendment rights.  Id. at 2. 
 114. Id. 
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fundamental fairness” warrant application of the exclusionary rule in 
immigration proceedings, the BIA issued another unpublished opinion in 
the removal case of Roberto Cervantes-Valerio.115  Though not dismissing, 
the BIA did remand when the respondents challenged the judge’s refusal 
to hold a hearing on their Motion to Suppress the Form I-213,116 where 
respondents alleged that the information contained therein regarding 
identity and alienage was improperly obtained by officials who lacked a 
“reasonable suspicion” sufficient to support a lawful apprehension.117  
The BIA noted that the judge’s ruling denying the motion failed to address 
whether the admission of the documents was fundamentally fair, whether 
the respondents had been lawfully stopped, or whether respondents had 
established the existence of an egregious violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.  In its ruling, the BIA, citing Lopez-Mendoza, Matter of 
Sandoval, and more recent decisions such as Navarro-Diaz118 and 
Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales,119 reiterated that a seizure is egregious if it 
is “gross or unreasonable” or “sufficiently severe,” the standard of the 
Second Circuit. 
Further, the BIA seemed determined to remind the immigration judges 
that procedural requirements applicable in removal hearings should not 
be ignored: first, removal hearings must be conducted in accordance 
with requirements specified in the relevant Code of Federal Regulations, 
requiring that when there are contested issues of removability, the IJ 
“shall receive evidence as to any unresolved issues”;120 and second, the 
INA121 mandates that respondents have a reasonable opportunity to 
examine the evidence against them, to present evidence on their own 
behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the DHS.122  The 
 
 115. In re Cervantes-Valerio, at *2 (B.I.A. Oct. 2, 2009), available at www. 
bibdaily.com (search Cervantes-Valerio). 
 116. Record of Deportable Alien.  The I-213 is the form created by the legacy I.N.S. 
officer or the ICE officer with biographical information about a noncitizen as well as 
information obtained through undercover investigations, other law enforcement agencies, 
the USCIS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and other agencies. It is generally 
created during the questioning of a noncitizen to obtain information to place him in removal 
proceedings. See 1 NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, IMMIGRATION LAW & DEFENSE § 7.5 (West, 
3d ed. 2009). 
 117. In re Cervantes-Valerio, supra note 115, at *1. 
 118. United States v. Navarro-Diaz, 420 F.3d 581, 587 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 119. Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 235-36 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 120. The Court here cited 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(d) (2010). 
 121. Immigration and Nationality Act, 36 I.N.A. § 240(b)(4)(B) (2010). 
 122. For recent commentary on the critiques leveled against the fairness of hearings 
before both the BIA and the immigration courts, see Lindsey R. Vaala, Bias on the Bench: 
Raising the Bar for U.S. Immigration Judges to Ensure Equality for Asylum Seekers, 49 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1011 (2007); Grant, supra note 90, at 954. 
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BIA specified in Cervantes-Valerio’s remanded hearing that these 
requirements were to be followed.123 
As a way to further discern the BIA’s position on the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments and suppression of tainted evidence, I reviewed all published 
BIA cases from 2006–2009 and studied the six in which Motions to 
Suppress were filed.  The BIA affirmed the judges’ denials of Motions 
to Suppress in four cases, and in only two of the six did the BIA alter the 
judges’ decisions.  One resulted in a remand, the other in a dismissal of 
the removal proceedings.  One surely turned on a race-based stop, and 
the other probably did as well. 
In the case involving the remand, it appears that the facts may have 
made out a case for an egregious violation of Fourth Amendment rights 
based on unlawful race discrimination, an inference impossible to 
confirm, as the immigration judge failed to specify sufficient details to 
make the inference.124  In the case, the respondent claimed he was arrested 
solely because he was speaking Spanish and because he was Hispanic.125  
The BIA appeared to agree with the respondent that the Form I-213 
indicated that the stop was solely based on the respondent’s Hispanic 
appearance and thus could be found to have been egregious. In addition, 
there was apparently no independent evidence offered to establish the 
respondent’s removability other than the fruit of the unlawful arrest. 
In the case involving dismissal, the DHS had appealed the immigration 
judge’s ruling terminating proceedings; the BIA dismissed the appeal 
and affirmed the termination.126  At the removal hearing, because the judge 
found that respondent’s arrest had been egregious and a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment, he suppressed the evidence obtained as a result 
thereof.  The BIA agreed with the immigration judge that the respondent 
was neither asked about his immigration status before he was arrested 
nor arrested for safety concerns; rather, his arrest was based solely on his 
Hispanic appearance and his limited English, constituting an egregious 
violation of the Fourth Amendment that warranted suppression of the 
evidence gathered as a result of the unlawful activity.127 
 
 123. In re Cervantes-Valerio, supra note 115, at *3. 
 124. In re Guerrero-Renovato, 2009 WL 2171592 (B.I.A. July 8, 2009). 
 125. Id. at *2. 
 126. In re Avalos-Casillas, 2008 WL 4722664 (B.I.A. Oct. 7, 2008). 
 127. Id. at *2 (citing Gonzalez-Rivera v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 22 F.3d 
1441, 1449-52 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
SCHARF ARTICLE - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/9/2010  2:01 PM 
 
80 
B. Coming Full Circle: Immigration Courts on the Front Line—                 
The Boston Immigration Court 
In the fact that the BIA speaks through the local immigration court 
judges as well as with its own voice, it is instructive to revisit how 
immigration judges are handling Fourth Amendment issues.  While I 
have been unable to identify all of the Fourth Amendment-related opinions 
of the sitting immigration judges around the nation, there is at least one 
other case besides that of the Hartford Immigration Court Judge described 
earlier in this article in which objections to evidence offered by the 
government resulted in a dismissal of the removal charges.  In this 2009 
case decided by the Boston Immigration Court, Immigration Judge 
Leonard A. Shapiro found violations of 8 C.F.R. § 287 and of both the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, excluded the evidence garnered from an 
illegal search and, ultimately, dismissal of the case because of a dearth 
of evidence.128 
In fact, in that case, the judge actually found that the government 
agents’ activity to have been unconstitutional.129  Procedurally, the judge 
initially found that the respondent had met her burden of establishing a 
prima facie case for suppression,”130  in that documentary evidence was 
not shown to have been obtained “independent of, and prior to “a 
warrantless search and arrest.”131  In his finding, Judge Shapiro, while 
acknowledging that “the exclusionary rule does not generally apply in 
removal proceedings,132 nonetheless noted the appropriateness of applying 
it to suppress evidence acquired in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
where the violation was egregious.133  In this particular case, that is 
precisely what he found. 
 
 128. In Removal Proceedings (Bos. Immigr. Ct., Aug. 25, 2009) (Shapiro, I.J.). 
 129. More than one regulation was violated.  First, 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(f)(2), which 
requires consent of owners or occupants of a residence before immigration officers enter 
without a warrant.  The next regulation required that that unless one is likely to escape before 
a warrant can be issued, immigration officers must obtain an arrest warrant.  8 C.F.R. § 
287.8(c)(2)(ii).  The Judge noted that “[t]hese regulations are mandated by the Constitution, 
and a violation implicates constitutional rights.” Id. at *10. 
 130. In re Barcenas, 19 I. & N. Dec. 609, 611 (B.I.A 1988). 
 131. In Removal Proceedings, supra note 128, at *8, (citing Murray v. United States, 
487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988)). 
 132. Id. at *5 (citing Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 
U.S. 1032, 1051 (1984)). 
 133. Id. at *5 (citing Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050-51 & Navarro-Chalan v. 
Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 19, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that Lopez-Mendoza “left the door 
open [for application of the exclusionary rule] in cases of egregious violations of Fourth 
Amendment or other liberties.”)). 
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The facts of the case are instructive.  It began with a warrantless 
search of a third floor apartment in Newburyport, Massachusetts at 4:10 
a.m. on August 23, 2007.134  Testimony showed that respondent, who 
shared the apartment with her fiancé and four others, “awoke suddenly 
to someone pounding on her bedroom door.”  They became “confused 
and did not understand who it could be or why someone would punch 
their bedroom door in the middle of the night.  They thought it might be 
the fire department.”  Respondent “turned the key to unlock the door.”  
As she did this, “two men pushed the door open and entered the bedroom.  
The lights were off, and everything was dark.  The men shined a flashlight 
in their faces and told them [both of whom were naked] not to speak.”  
One “tried to grab a towel to give to [respondent], but the men said, 
‘don’t get anything’ and get out of here.”  Respondent’s fiancé “grabbed 
his shorts and [respondent] had to get out of bed, completely naked, in 
front of the men.  She grabbed her pajamas at the end of the bed and put 
them on.”  The men took respondent and her fiancé “to the living room 
and told them to sit on the couch.  The officers did not indicate who they 
were, did not show [respondent] . . . any documents or papers, and did not 
tell them where they were going, and [respondent] did not know who 
they were or that they were immigration officers.  Their uniforms had 
“ICE” printed on them. A female officer asked [respondent] for her 
passport, and [respondent] told her that it was in their bedroom, but she 
could not recall where.  As soon as she said where her passport was, 
another officer went to [respondent’s] room to look for it . . . She did not 
feel that she could get up and leave because they were intimidating her 
and making her scared.  [Respondent] requested to use the restroom, and 
the female officer went with her and stayed with her in the bathroom 
until she was finished.”  Before respondent and her fiancé “were taken to 
Boston, the officers placed them in handcuffs.  From Boston to the 
detention facility, restraints were also placed on [respondent’s] ankles.  
Once in Boston, the officers locked [respondent] in one of the cells, 
separated from the others.  No one told her what was going on.  After 
a while, someone came with papers for [respondent] to sign.  [Respondent] 
did not know what the papers meant, and she was afraid.  She did not sign 
the papers . . . After [respondent] was released after paying bond, 
[respondent] returned to her apartment and, once there, took pictures of 
 
 134. Id. at *2. 
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the apartment, which was “messy and disorganized, . . . different than its 
condition before the incident occurred.”135  “[Respondent] testified that one 
of the photographs was of her bedroom.  The picture showed a dresser 
with various drawers missing.  [Respondent] testified that she did not 
take the drawers out, and they had not been like that before she left the 
apartment on August 23 . . . The officers seized her passport and have 
not returned it.”136 
In his opinion following this description, Judge Shapiro stated that 
even though regulations governing immigration arrests had been violated 
in this case, these violations alone would not have warranted suppression 
of the evidence obtained therefrom.137 Nonetheless, he dismissed the 
case upon finding, in addition, that the regulatory violations implicated 
constitutional rights, maintaining that “to admit any evidence derived 
from those violations would compromise the fundamental fairness of the 
removal proceedings.”138 
Therefore, there is consistency in the BIA’s approach to Fourth 
Amendment claims: it applies the law of the federal courts of appeals 
from which cases arise, encountering little trouble identifying cases brought 
solely on account of the race of the respondent, and dismisses those 
cases.  The immigration judges—or at least the two surveyed in this 
piece—apply the Fourth Amendment and seem to extend their inquiries 
to the Fifth Amendment as well because, as Judge Shapiro noted, “[t]he 
circumstances surrounding an arrest or seizure of evidence may in some 
instances render evidence inadmissible because it would violate the Fifth 
Amendment’s requirement of fundamental fairness.”139 
V. IS THE STRICT INTERPRETATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN 
IMMIGRATION HEARINGS “CRACKED”140  BEYOND REPAIR? 
Predictability and uniformity in judicial decisions are fundamental to 
due process.141  The Fourth Amendment’s proscription against introducing 
 
 135. Id. at *3. 
 136. Id. at *4. 
 137. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 287.12 & Navarro-Chalan, 359 F.3d at 23 (requiring 
regulations to have a purpose to benefit respondents in order for violations to require 
dismissal). 
 138. Id. at *10 (citing Navia–Duran v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 568 F.2d 
808-09 (1st Cir. 1977). 
 139. Id. at *5. 
 140. See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 5 (reference to the term “cracks”). 
 141. See, e.g., Francis v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 532 F.2d 268, 273 
(2nd Cir. 1976) (“Fundamental fairness dictates that permanent resident aliens who are in like 
circumstances, but for irrelevant and fortuitous factors, be treated in a like manner.”). 
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evidence gathered owing to breaches of fundamental rights is a touchstone 
of our constitutional society.  Yet on this issue, the federal circuit courts 
of appeals, courts so central to the successful functioning of our judiciary, 
not only suffer conceptual differences, but also tolerate among them 
statistically-significant discrepancies in reversal or remand rates of BIA 
cases.142  These disparities demonstrate a broken system, and mandate that 
the jurisprudence surrounding the Fourth Amendment in immigration cases 
be repaired. 
A recent study of the federal circuit courts on a different issue—whether 
they have jurisdiction to stay a grant of voluntary departure143 pending 
judicial review144—found significant discrepancies.  The authors concluded 
that distinctions among the circuits,145 and the unpredictability resulting 
therefrom, run counter to the “longstanding goal of uniformity within 
national immigration policy.”146  The need for uniformity in this arena was 
even stressed by Alexander Hamilton when he argued in The Federalist 
Papers that “the power over naturalization must ‘necessarily be exclusive; 
 
 142. See Grant, supra note 90, at 956–57 n.198 (surveying reversal and affirmance 
rates for nine circuits, from information available in December 2009 and based on the 
last 136 court decision on the merits involving petitions for rev of BIA decisions of both 
published and unpublished cases.  The average affirmance rate for the eight circuits reviewed 
is 89%., yet the discrepancy in rates of affirmance and accordingly in rates of remand or 
reversal among the circuits surveyed varied from 63% to 99%, a significant difference.  
The breakdown by circuits reveals the following affirmance rates: 1st Circuit, 90%; 2nd 
Circuit, an 84%; in the 3rd Circuit, 84%; 4th Circuit, 97%; 5th Circuit, 93%; 6th Circuit, 
82%; 7th Circuit, 63%; 9th Circuit, 80%; and in the 11th Circuit, 99%.). 
 143. Voluntary departure allows a respondent in a removal hearing to pay his/her 
own way back home, avoiding many of the adverse effects of removal. 
 144. See Grant, supra note 90. 
 145. This question of circuit splits has become a more significant issue since the 1996 
passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, or 
“IIRAIRA.”  Since this enactment, there has been considerable confusion among the 
circuit courts when interpreting various vague sections of the law.  One such example arises 
in the effect of differing states’ classification of crimes; under IIRAIRA convictions of 
certain crimes prevent a grant of voluntary departure.  Many of the crimes in question are 
defined at the state level.  The circuit courts have had difficulty setting uniform parameters as 
to which state crimes, under IIRAIRA, forestall voluntary departure grants and, accordingly, 
as to the precise extent of their jurisdiction to review such grants.  See Nicole Abruzzo, 
Voluntary Departure Post-Iiraira: A Struggle Between Equitable Considerations Promoting 
Clemency Measures, and Statutory Considerations Tending Towards Oppression, 21 ST. 
JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 881, 883 (2007). 
 146. Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 311-12 (3rd Cir. 2002) (noting that the 
Constitution and notions of “fundamental fairness” support the policy of uniformity in 
the immigration context); see also Cazarez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 905, 913 (9th 
Cir. 2004). 
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because if each State had power to prescribe a Distinct Rule there could 
be no Uniform Rule.’”147 
Courts have expressed concern about this type of disparate treatment, 
particularly as it relates to “similarly situated aliens under the immigration 
laws.”148  In Gerbier v. Holmes, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
emphasized the need for uniformity in immigration law, noting its concern 
that those “convicted of drug offenses in different states . . . would be 
treated differently with respect to deportation and cancellation of 
removal . . . This cannot be what Congress intended in establishing a 
“uniform” immigration law.”149 
The Supreme Court is also inclined to favor uniformity in instances in 
which varying state definitions of what constitutes criminal conduct have 
federal sentencing consequences,150 in one case rejecting, on this basis, 
the Eighth Circuit’s approach to the issue and mentioning its concern 
about the possibility of unequal punishments for identical criminal 
conduct.151 
The adverse consequences of these discrepant federal circuit court 
decisions, in the Fourth Amendment cases as well as in other issues, 
extend beyond the theoretical: they adversely affect attorney–client 
relationships, interfering with the immigration attorney’s ability to provide 
effective legal representation.  For example, clients can feel pressure 
to move from one jurisdiction to another in an effort to find a circuit 
court forum that will enhance their chances of success in immigration 
court.152 
“[I]nterpretations of the federal immigration statute vary greatly from 
district to district and from circuit to circuit.  These days, to effectively 
represent his or her client, the successful immigration practitioner must 
be well-versed not only in the law that applies in his or her backyard, but 
also the law as applied across the country from sea to shining sea.”153  
For example, a client applying for naturalization needs to establish good 
moral character, but a conviction for certain crimes in some circuits 
 
 147. Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d at 311 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 at 181, 
182 (Alexander Hamilton)); See Jeff Yates, Todd A. Collins & Gabriel J. Chin, A War 
on Drugs or a War on Immigrants?  Expanding the Definition of “Drug Trafficking” in 
Determining Aggravated Felon Status for Noncitizens, 64 MD. L. REV. 875, 904-05 (2005). 
 148. Aguirre v. United States, 79 F.3d 315, 317 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 149. Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d at 312. 
 150. Yates et al., supra note 147, at 905-06. 
 151. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 590-91 (1990); see also Yates et al., 
supra note 148, at 906. 
 152. Jeff Joseph, Mary Holper & Gerald Seipp, The Importance of Finding the “Right” 
Circuit for Your Immigration Case, 09-04 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (Apr. 2009). 
 153. Id. 
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would prevent such a finding while in others it would not; thus, in some 
cases, clients would be well-served by moving to a different circuit.154  
That lawyers must advise clients to actually engage in a physical move 
to a different jurisdiction underscores the grim situation in which we 
find ourselves, whereby it is claimed that we operate within a federal 
system, yet, in an area of such national importance as the enforcement of 
our immigration laws, we hardly do. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Of the four federal circuit courts of appeals that have spoken recently 
concerning the exclusion issue in immigration courts—the First, Second, 
Eighth, and Ninth—only one, the First Circuit, imposes a standard that 
truly reflects adherence to Lopez-Mendoza’s requirement for egregious 
behavior—misconduct by threats, coercion, or physical abuse —to exclude 
evidence.155  The remaining circuits have essentially ignored, or perhaps 
discarded, the Supreme Court’s prescription as they ruled, serially, that, 
for evidence offered in removal hearings to be excluded as violating the 
Fourth Amendment,  
it must be established either that (a) “an egregious violation that was fundamentally 
unfair had occurred or (b) that the violation—regardless of its egregiousness or 
unfairness—undermined the reliability of the evidence in dispute.”156  In addition, 
this Circuit reiterated that where the reliability of evidence is in dispute, even if the 
conduct was not egregious, exclusion is warranted.157 (Second Circuit)158 
it must be established that there was a custodial detention without justification 
that “offends” the Fourth Amendment159 (Eighth Circuit); and, finally, that 
it was obtained either as the result of a deliberate violation of the Fourth Amendment 
or as the result of conduct that a reasonable officer should have known violated 
the Constitution.160 (Ninth Circuit) 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 71-72 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 156. Singh v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 207, 215 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Pinto-Montoya v. 
Mukasey, 540 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 
231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006))). 
 157. Id. (citing Almeida-Amaral, 461 F.3d at 235). 
 158. See Singh, 553 F.3d at 207. 
 159. United States v. Flores-Sandoval, 422 F.3d 711, 712 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 160. Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 .3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Adamson 
v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 745 F.2d 541, 545 (9th Cir. 1984)); see Orhorhaghe v. 
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 38 F.3d 488 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming the Immigration 
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 None of these statements reflects Lopez-Mendoza’s ruling on the Fourth 
Amendment.  Rather, each seems to ignore that rule and to be applying, 
actually, traditional Fourth Amendment principles.  In fact, these rulings 
essentially reflect the exclusionary rule long in place in non-immigration 
or criminal cases. 
While there appears, then, to be some consistency, at least among 
three of the eleven federal circuits, this consistency does not address the 
lack of uniformity among the rest of the courts.  Nor does it establish 
reliability at the BIA, which generally applies the law of the circuit in 
which the case arose.  “Thus, the law applied by the BIA differs by federal 
circuit, where there is a split between the circuits, or where a particular 
issue has been decided in one circuit but not another.”161  Different rules 
should not apply when such a vital right is at stake, where the protection 
accorded is based on the fortuity of the location in which an immigration 
case is heard.  If immigration rules are so central to protecting the 
sovereignty of our nation,162 as the Supreme Court has been professing 
for over one hundred years, interpretation of those rules should not depend 
on the fortuitousness of the jurisdiction in which a case is heard.163 
The Supreme Court is unlikely to accept certiorari on this issue, given 
its low rate of acceptance and the limited scope of the cases it does hear, 
particularly in the area of immigration.164  Hence, resolution of this 
unsettling issue, though important, seems left to the federal circuit courts; 
otherwise, if the distinctions would persist, lack of both respect for and 
deference to the courts is the likely outcome.165 
 
Judge’s suppression of passport and Form I-94 seized in an egregious violation of 
constitutional rights involving both a race-based stop and invasive search techniques). 
 161. Paul O’Dwyer, A Well-Founded Fear Of Having My Sexual Orientation Asylum 
Claim Heard In The Wrong Court, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 185, 193 (2007-2008). 
 162. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case) 130 U.S. 581, 
610-11 (1889); see also Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892); Fong Yue 
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
 163. While it is true that discrepancies among the circuit courts of appeals are 
tolerated on other issues, in this situation, because it is fundamental to the provision of 
due process, it should not be.  An expansive study of the reasons why this issue is some 
much more fundamental than are others involving circuit differences and therefore 
should not be permitted is beyond the scope of this article. 
 164. The immigration cases it has accepted in the past decade dealt with issues so 
different from this one, which can be characterized as a micro-issue of how to conduct 
immigration hearings, it is doubtful the Court would accept certiorari on this issue.  The 
cases they accepted concerned indefinite detention, Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), 
and pre-trial detention, Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 165.  See Michele Benedetto, Crisis on The Immigration Bench, 73 BROOK L. REV. 
467 (2008) (arguing that inconsistencies in grant rates for decisions among immigration 
courts reflects a lack of judicial ethics). 
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The recent blending of criminal and immigration law166 resulting from 
IIRAIRA and its progeny167 enhances the argument that the exclusionary 
rule’s application in the criminal and immigration courts must be unified.  It 
is wrong, unjust, and I suggest unconstitutional for the same evidence to 
be inadmissible in one court of the United States and not in another.  The 
old adage that immigration matters are simply civil ones because 
removal is a civil remedy no longer stands.  This is true not only because 
deportation is truly punishment and is essentially a criminal remedy,168 
but also because of the numerous immigration law violations that had 
been just but are now crimes;169 the criminalization of immigration 
law violators is well under way.170 
The need to unify treatment of the Fourth Amendment between the 
criminal and immigration courts raises the question as to what should 
replace the Lopez-Mendoza test.171 Abandoning the Lopez-Mendoza 
proscription against Fourth Amendment application in removal hearings 
is insufficient.  It is not acceptable to say that the rule is both morally 
wrong and also unconstitutional without offering a workable alternative 
that is likely to be effective and to avoid causing novel problems.  In 
searching for a remedy, one can find solutions by studying adjustments 
made in other fields of law as their jurisprudence has developed.  For 
example, illustrations from the field of Tort law can shed light on 
 
 166. One might more accurately characterize it as “confusion between” the two areas of 
law. 
 167. See supra discussion accompanying note 13. 
 168.  I do consider it to be that; in fact it has been established that the consequences 
are often worse for one removed than for one convicted of a crime.  One convicted 
spends some time in a United States prison, with all the protections that go along with that— 
law libraries, exercise, medical care, even education.  However, deportation is banishment.  
This proposition was set out by Justice Brewer in his dissent in Fong Yue Ting. Fong 
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (“[i]f a banishment of this sort be not a 
punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it will be difficult to imagine a 
doom to which the name can be applied.”).  For other relevant cases discussing the punitive 
nature of deportation, see Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 176 (1923) and Bridges v. 
Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945).  For further discussion, see Robert Pauw, A New Look At 
Deportation as Punishment: Why At Least Some of The Constitution’s Criminal Procedure 
Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305 (2000). 
 169. One such example is illegal reentry following deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) 
(9)(A) (2006). 
 170. See Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, And Sovereign Power, 
supra note 13. 
 171. With the turmoil of tests that have been documented in this article, it is difficult to 
say seriously that there really is not any Lopez-Mendoza test in any event. 
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possible solutions.  In recent years, many states have eliminated parent–
child immunity as well as the distinctions in the degree of care owed to 
those injured on private land.  States eliminating parent–child immunity 
have generally replaced long-standing special rules with a general duty 
to avoid being negligent.  States eliminating the distinctions in the degree of 
care owed to those injured on one’s land, which had been based on rigid 
classifications of trespasser, licensee, or invitee, have also substituted a 
negligence standard of care in its stead. 
In like manner, we should replace Lopez-Mendoza’s archaic principle 
of non-applicability of the Fourth Amendment in removal hearings with 
a general, well-settled constitutional principle—that evidence gathered 
as a result of violations of the Fourth Amendment must be suppressed.  
The Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have already 
demonstrated to the remainder of the circuits, and to the BIA, how they 
have dealt with the question and have offered their own sensible solution; 
they have essentially interposed their own “general negligence standard,” 
the standard of traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
It should suffice when an immigration respondent proves that 
government agents violated constitutional rights in the gathering of 
evidence to support the case.  One should not have to prove that these 
rights were violated egregiously, by misconduct, by threats, by coercion, 
by physical abuse, by a deliberate violation of the Constitution, or as the 
result of conduct that a government agent should have known violated 
the Constitution.  A violation of constitutional rights is a violation of 
constitutional rights, and when it comes to violations generating evidence to 
be introduced in the all-important removal hearing, that evidence is 
tainted, ab initio, should be treated as such, and should be excluded. 
 
Author’s Note:  Immigration law, being progressive in nature, it is not 
surprising that the argument made herein is taking hold.  Since this 
article was drafted, additional Immigration Courts have ruled that 
Fourth Amendment rights were violated during unreasonable searches, 
and judges have suppressed the evidence gathered as a result (see the 
mid-Atlantic region).  Readers can look forward to further progress on 
this issue in the near future, including rulings from the BIA. 
 
 
 
